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Essay 
The Boundaries of Constituent Authority 
YANIV ROZNAI 
This Article delves into the question of the boundaries of constitution-making 
power. Traditionally, constituent power is regarded as an original, inherent and 
unlimited power. That is why constitution-making moments are described in the 
literature as a kind of ‘wild-west.’ Constituent power is unbound by prior 
constitutional rules. But does this mean that it is unlimited in the sense that it can 
disregard any basic principles, or should we endorse Benjamin Constant’s 
declaration that “sovereignty of the people is not unlimited”?  
This Article provides a preliminary sketch of possible limits of constituent 
power. First, according to some approaches to constitution-making powers, there 
must be certain limitations even on constituent power derived from natural law. In 
fact, Sieyès himself remarked that ‘prior to and above the nation, there is only 
natural law,’ which implies that Sieyès viewed constituent power as limited by 
certain principles.  
Moreover, nowadays, international and supra-national law may impose 
various limitations on the constitution-making power.  
Furthermore, if the goal of constitution-making is not to produce a written 
constitution, but to promote constitutionalism, then a plausible argument is that 
constitutionalism and constitutions are inseparably linked so that an exercise of 
constituent power cannot undermine constitutionalism but must be linked to 
certain common principles of law.   
Finally, the very concept of constituent power may carry certain inherent 
limitations, since in order to be consistent with the idea of ‘the people giving itself 
a constitution,’ it must observe certain fundamental rights that are necessary for 
constituent power to preserve itself and reappear in the future. 
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The Boundaries of Constituent Authority 
YANIV ROZNAI * 
Dedicated to Rick Kay, a legal giant and a friend 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of Constituent Power involves legal theory at its highest 
level. Claude Klein proposes that this is why “jurists throughout history 
have always been fascinated by the constituent power and its theory.”1 
However, whereas continental European and Latin American scholarship 
frequently dealt with constituent power, Anglo-American legal debates 
somehow neglected it.2 In the United Kingdom, this was probably due to 
the absence of a written constitution, and in the American debates, this was 
possibly due to the stability of the 1787 Constitution and the prevailing 
approach of constituent power contained within Article V that describes 
the amendment process—therefore, constituent power “plays no direct role 
in American constitutionalism.”3  
                                                                                                                     
* Associate Professor, Harry Radzyner Law School, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya. This 
is part of a larger book project tentatively called: WE THE LIMITED PEOPLE? CONSTITUENT POWER AND 
THE BOUNDARIES OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING (in-progress) which began while I was a Post-Doctoral 
fellow at the Hauser Global Law School, New York University (NYU). I would like to thank Prof. 
Samuel Issacharoff for his mentoring during that period. Earlier versions of this paper were presented 
at Israel’s Law and Society Annual Conference (Bar Ilan University, 29 December 2019); Original 
Constitutionalist: Reconstructing Richard Kay’s Scholarship (University of Connecticut, 13 September 
2019); 2016 Annual Meeting of the International Society of Public Law (Humboldt University Berlin, 
18 June 2016); Minerva Center for the Rule of Law Under Extreme Conditions Board Workshop 
(University of Haifa, 6 June 2016); and NYU Law Schools’ Global Fellows Forum (NYU, 10 March 
2015). I thank participants for their remarks. Comments are welcome: yaniv.roznai@idc.ac.il. 
1  Claude Klein, A Propos Constituent Power: Some General Views in a Modern Context, in 
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS IN THE ERA OF INTEGRATION 31, 31 (A Jyränki ed., 1999).  
2 See, e.g., Dario Azzellini, Constituent and Constituted Power: Reading Social Transformation 
in Latin America, in POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND CONSTITUENT POWER IN LATIN AMERICA 15, 18–19 
(Emelio Betances & Carlos Figueroa Ibarra eds., 2016) (discussing the “wave of liberalization” that 
swept Latin America in the 1970s and the demand for direct democracy in the region, leading to 
“constituent moments” which resulted in some Latin American countries drafting and passing new 
constitutions). 
3  Stephen M. Griffin, Constituent Power and Constitutional Change in American 
Constitutionalism, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 49, 50, 65–66 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2007). See also Edward 
S. Corwin & Mary Louise Ramsey, The Constitutional Law of Constitutional Amendment, 26 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 185, 188 (1951) (raising the question of whether “[i]t is the purpose and result of Article 
V to delegate a certain power of constitutional amendment to the agencies designated by it, or [whether 
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Yet, constituent power has—and should have—an immense 
prominence to modern constitutionalism.4 That is why the unawareness of 
constituent power in the English-speaking world was at a very high price. 
Only in recent years, against the backdrop of recurring constitutional 
replacements,5 there is a renewed interest in the issue of 
constitution-making,6 a reintroduced discussion on the relationship 
between revolution and constitutional change,7 and accordingly a revival of 
attention to the concept of constituent power.8  
                                                                                                                     
it is] merely to provide a method for the more convenient future use of an already existing power of the 
people”). 
4  See Marco Goldoni & Christopher McCorkindale, Why We (Still) Need a Revolution, 14 
GERMAN L.J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 2197, 2213 (2013) (arguing that “the British tradition of political 
constitutionalism . . . has paid insufficient attention to the concept of constituent power”).  
5  See Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins & Justin Blount, Does the Process of Constitution-Making 
Matter?, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 201, 202 (2009) (estimating that in any given year, about four or 
five constitutions are replaced).  
6  For examples of recent publications exploring the topic of constitution-making, see generally 
ANDREW ARATO, POST SOVEREIGN CONSTITUTION MAKING: LEARNING AND LEGITIMACY (2016); 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTION MAKING (David Landau & Hanna Lerner eds., 2019); CONSTITUENT 
ASSEMBLIES (Jon Elster et al. eds., 2018); CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDER (Gregory Shaffer et al. eds., 2019); CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN ASIA: DECOLONISATION AND 
STATE-BUILDING IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE (H. Kumarasingham ed., 2016); 
CONSTITUTION MAKING (Sujit Choudhry & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2016); TODD A. EISENSTADT ET AL., 
CONSTITUENTS BEFORE ASSEMBLY: PARTICIPATION, DELIBERATION, AND REPRESENTATION IN THE 
CRAFTING OF NEW CONSTITUTIONS (2017); FOUNDING MOMENTS IN CONSTITUTIONALISM (Richard 
Albert et al. eds., 2019); PATTERNS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: THE ROLE OF CITIZENS AND ELITES 
IN CONSTITUTION-MAKING (Jonathan Wheatley & Fernando Mendez eds., 2013). 
7  See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTIONS: CHARISMATIC 
LEADERSHIP AND THE RULE OF LAW (2019) (discussing Ackerman’s “three ideal types” of paths to 
constitutional legitimacy, the first of which considers revolutionary movements); GARY J. JACOBSOHN 
& YANIV ROZNAI, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 34 (2020) (conceptualizing the term ‘constitutional 
revolution’ as “a paradigmatic displacement, however achieved, of the conceptual prism through which 
constitutionalism is experienced in a given polity”); REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTIONALISM: LAW, 
LEGITIMACY, POWER (Richard Albert ed., 2020) (a collection of essays engaging with Ackerman’s 
book Revolutionary Constitutions); NIMER SULTANY,  LAW AND REVOLUTION: LEGITIMACY AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AFTER THE ARAB SPRING (2017) (discussing the Arab Spring and the 
surrounding issues of “revolutions, legitimacy, legality, [and] constitutions”). 
8 For examples of publications exploring the concept of constituent power, see generally ANDREW 
ARATO, THE ADVENTURES OF THE CONSTITUENT POWER: BEYOND REVOLUTIONS? (2017) (discussing 
constituent power in regime transitions in Spain and South Africa); JOEL COLÓN-RÍOS, CONSTITUENT 
POWER AND THE LAW (2020); ZORAN OKLOPCIC, BEYOND THE PEOPLE: SOCIAL IMAGINARY AND 
CONSTITUENT IMAGINATION (2018); POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND CONSTITUENT POWER IN LATIN 
AMERICA: DEMOCRACY FROM BELOW (Emelio Betances & Carlos Figueroa Ibarra eds., 2016); 
CONSTITUENT POWER: LAW, POPULAR RULE AND POLITICS (Matilda Arvidsson, Leila Brännström & 
Panu Minkkinen eds., 2020); LUCIA RUBINELLI, CONSTITUENT POWER: A HISTORY (2020); MIKAEL 
SPANG, CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: ABOVE, WITHIN AND BESIDE THE 
CONSTITUTION (2014); ILLAN RUA WALL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONSTITUENT POWER: WITHOUT 
MODEL OR WARRANTY (2012); MARK WENMAN, AGONISTIC DEMOCRACY: CONSTITUENT POWER IN 
THE ERA OF GLOBALISATION (2013). 
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Constituent power is the driving force behind constitution-making,9 
which, in the modern era, is considered to be held by “the people.”10 This 
vague idea, however, conceals many complexities. Who are the people? 
Can they speak in one voice? How can they express their will? These are 
just some of the vexing questions that surround the question of the people’s 
constituent power.11  
There are, of course, different modalities of exercise of constituent 
power, and experience in diverse countries indicates a wide variety of 
options as to the arenas for constitution-making, such as constituent 
assemblies, referenda, popular initiatives, round-tables, expert committees, 
parliamentary legislation, and even judicial involvement. This Article does 
not focus on the process of constitution-making, important as this issue 
may be, but rather it focuses on a more theoretical question: Are “the 
people,” in their constituent capacity, substantively limited in any way? In 
other words, what are (if any) the material boundaries of constituent 
power? This question may carry practical implications since, if constituent 
power is conceived as limited, then certain actions by the constituent 
authority may be considered as ultra vires or illegitimate from the legal 
perspective and hence, at least as a matter of theory, a constitution may be 
considered “unconstitutional.”12   
In his seminal article, Constituent Authority, Richard Kay refers to 
constituent authority as “the things that a given people in a given time and 
place understand as competent to make a binding constitution.”13 Kay thus 
focuses on the practical authority that actually produces a constitution 
                                                                                                                     
9 MARTIN LOUGHLIN, THE IDEA OF PUBLIC LAW 100 (2003). 
10  Ulrich K. Preuss, The Exercise of Constituent Power in Central and Eastern Europe, in THE 
PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 3, at 211–12 (2007) (noting that the authority of 
constituents—the people—is what gives constitutions validity, but that such a simple explanation raises 
additional questions). 
11  See generally Mark Tushnet, Constitution-Making: An Introduction, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1983, 
1988–89 (2013) (discussing one complication stemming from the people’s constituent power—the 
ability of constituent power to “call itself into being, disregarding restraints created by itself in an 
earlier appearance”). For a discussion on the concept of constituent power, see Joel I. Colón-Ríos, Five 
Conceptions of Constituent Power, 130 LAW Q. REV. 306 (2014); Martin Loughlin, The Concept of 
Constituent Power, 13 EUR. J. POL. THEORY 218 (2014); Alexander Somek, Constituent Power in 
National and Transnational Contexts, 3 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 31 (2012); Chris Thornhill, 
Contemporary Constitutionalism and the Dialectic of Constituent Power, 1 GLOBAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 369 (2012); Martin Loughlin, On Constituent Power, in CONSTITUTIONALISM 
BEYOND LIBERALISM 151, 171 (Michael W. Dowdle & Michael A. Wilkinson eds., 2017); Yaniv 
Roznai, “We the People”, “Oui, the People” and the Collective Body: Perceptions of Constituent 
Power, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 295 (Gary Jacobsohn & Miguel Schor eds., 2018).  
12  For a discussion on the idea of unconstitutional constitutions, see generally Richard Albert, 
Four Unconstitutional Constitutions and Their Democratic Foundations, 50 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 169 
(2017); David Landau, Rosalind Dixon & Yaniv Roznai, From an Unconstitutional Constitutional 
Amendment to an Unconstitutional Constitution? Lessons from Honduras, 8 GLOBAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 40 (2019). 
13 Richard S. Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 716 (2011).  
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because, as he notes, “constituent authority, like constituent power, is a 
factual not a moral competence.”14 This Article’s theoretical approach 
would be a methodological dualism. Like Kay, in this Article I use 
comparative examples of actual cases in which constituent authority was 
regarded as limited. But I also suggest a normative theory for how the 
proper use of constituent authority should be understood. 
I. CONSTITUTION-MAKING MOMENTS – A “WILD-WEST”? 
In order to properly address the scope of constitution-making power 
one ought to return to the theoretical roots of constituent power. Although 
appearing in earlier periods, the concept of constituent power is relatively 
modern; emerging most forcefully in the French and North-America’s 
revolutionary thinking.15 In his famous political pamphlet Qu’est-ce que le 
Tiers état?, Abbé Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès writes that “in each of its parts 
a constitution is not the work of a constituted power but a constituent 
power.”16 Sieyès made a distinction between constituted power—the power 
created by the constitution, and constituent power—the extraordinary 
power to form a constitution, the immediate expression of the nation. In 
contrast with the independence of constituent power from any 
constitutional forms and restrictions, constituted power is an ordinary, 
limited power, that functions according to the forms and mode the nation 
grants it in positive law.17 And consequently, according to the traditional 
constitutional thinking, the two powers are different: constituent power is a 
power external to the constitutional order and therefore considered to be 
free and independent from any formal bonds of positive law: “The nation,” 
Sieyès wrote, “exists prior to everything; It is the origin of everything. Its 
                                                                                                                     
14 Id. at 720. 
15 See, e.g., CLAUDE KLEIN, THÉORIE ET PRATIQUE DU POUVOIR CONSTITUENT 31–34 (1996) 
(analyzing the question of whether there can be an extra-constitutional amendment outside Amendment 
V to the U.S. Constitution); William Partlett, The American Tradition of Constituent Power, 15 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 955, 958 (2017) (explaining that “Section 1 will describe the dominant belief that a 
revolutionary expression of constituent power requires broad inherent powers in constitution-making 
bodies, the basis for this approach in the practice of French revolutionary constitution-making . . . . 
Section 2 will begin an understanding of the American agency approach to constituent power, 
describing how Founding-era Americans saw conventions not as unlimited representatives of the 
people but instead as proposing bodies”); Lucia Rubinelli, Taming Sovereignty: Constituent Power in 
Nineteenth Century French Political Thought, 44 HIST. EUR. IDEAS 60, 60 (2018) (arguing “that the 
analysis of nineteenth-century French political thought offers a different account of constituent power’s 
history”). 
16 EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYÈS, What Is the Third Estate?, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 136 (Michael 
Sonenscher ed. & trans., 2003). See generally Lucia Rubinelli, How to Think Beyond Sovereignty: On 
Sieyes and Constituent Power, 18 EUR. J. POL. THEORY 47, 47 (2019) (“Based on extensive research in 
the archives, I show how Sieyes opposed the deployment of sovereignty by the revolutionary 
Assemblies and recommended replacing it with the idea of constituent power.”). 
17 SIEYÈS, supra note 16, at 134–37. 
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will is always legal. It is the law itself.”18 Constituted power, on the other 
hand, is inseparable from a pre-established constitutional order.19  
According to Sieyès, the positive constitution emanates “solely from 
the nation’s will,”20 and because “it would be ridiculous to suppose that the 
nation itself could be constricted by the procedures or the constitution to 
which it had subjected its mandatories,”21 constituent power has to be 
regarded as free from constitutional limits. “Not only is the nation not 
subject to a constitution,” Sieyès insists, “it cannot be and should not be . . 
.”22 So, according to this idea of constituent power, the nation (or the 
sovereign people) is exterior to the institutions and thus remains above the 
constitution. The constitution cannot limit the nation but only the 
constituted powers it created.23 
In his book from 1928, Verfassungslehre, Carl Schmitt further 
developed the doctrine of constituent power. Reiterating the idea that “the 
constitution does not establish itself,”24 Schmitt argued that the constitution 
“is valid because it derives from a constitution-making capacity . . . and is 
established by the will of this constitution-making power.”25 This 
“constitution-making power is the political will, whose power or authority 
is capable of making the concrete, comprehensive decision over the type 
and form of its own political existence.”26 Thus, the act of political will 
creates the constitution and decides the fundamental political decisions 
regarding the form of government, the state’s structure, and society’s 
highest principles and symbolic values.27 
Schmitt accepted Sieyès’ distinction between constituent and 
constituted power, and understood constituent power to be external to (and 
above) the constitution and, accordingly, unlimited and unrestricted by 
                                                                                                                     
18 Id. at 136–37. 
19  See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 39 (1998); Luigi 
Corrias, The Legal Theory of the Juridical Coup: Constituent Power Now, 12 GERMAN L.J. 1553, 
1558–59 (2011) (describing “the relationship between constituent and constituted power”). 
20 SIEYÈS, supra note 16, at 136. 
21 Id. The ‘nation’ is “a body of associates living under a common law, represented by the same 
legislature, etc.” Id. at 97. 
22  Id. at 137. See also Lucien Jaume, Constituent Power in France: The Revolution and Its 
Consequences, in LOUGHLIN & WALKER, supra note 3, at 67–68 (explaining what constituent power is 
and how French constitutional debates “generally evoked a sense of exteriority of the sovereign people 
in relation to their institution”). 
23 Olivier Jouanjan, What Is a Constitution? What Is Constitutional History?, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, LEGITIMACY, AND POWER: NINETEENTH-CENTURY EXPERIENCES 323, 330 
(Kelly L. Grotke & Markus J. Prutsch eds., 2014). 
24  CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 76 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., Duke Univ. Press 
2008) (1928).  
25 Id. at 64. 
26 Id. at 125. 
27  Id. at 76–77. See also ANDREAS KALYVAS, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLITICS OF THE 
EXTRAORDINARY: MAX WEBER, CARL SCHMITT AND HANNAH ARENDT 139 (2008). 
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positive constitutional forms or rules.28 Schmitt, in the words of Cristi, 
rejected “juridical normativism.”29 Constituent power is the “unmediated 
will” that cannot be regulated or limited by legal procedures or process.30 
Formalizing constituent power, Scheuerman wrote, would be “akin to 
transforming fire into water.”31  
Another “omnipotent” version of constituent power arrives from 
Antonio Negri, for whom any legal approach to constituent power fails 
because constituent power “comes from a void and constitutes 
everything.”32 Due to its extra-legal features, it is cable of upsetting 
constituted boundaries.33  
The idea that constituent power is unlimited was supported by legal 
and political theorists from different jurisdictions and diverse intellectual 
traditions. Olivier Beaud regards constituent power as sovereign. And for 
French positivists, such as Raymond Carré de Malberg, Georges Burdeau, 
Roger Bonnard, Guy Héraud, and Georges Vedel, constituent power—
which exists outside of any constitutional authority—is exercised in 
revolutionary settings, external to the positive laws (either forms, 
procedures, and limits) established by the constitution. It is not a legal 
power, but a pure fact.34 Hans Kelsen did not engage deeply with the 
question of constituent power, but rather claimed that the question of the 
basic norm or obedience to the historically first constitution is simply 
assumed or presupposed as a hypothesis in juristic thinking.35 Similarly, 
noted political scientist Carl Friedrich regarded constituent power not as a 
de jure power but a de facto power that is not based on a prior legal norm; 
                                                                                                                     
28 SCHMITT, supra note 24, at 125–27 (discussing constituent power and constitutional change).  
29  See Renato Cristi, Carl Schmitt on Sovereignty and Constituent Power, 10 CANADIAN J.L. & 
JURIS. 189, 198 (1997) (discussing Carl Schmitt’s changing views on topics such as sovereignty). 
30 SCHMITT, supra note 24, at 132. 
31 WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, CARL SCHMITT: THE END OF LAW 71 (1999). 
32 See generally ANTONIO NEGRI, INSURGENCIES: CONSTITUENT POWER AND THE MODERN STATE 
(Maurizia Boscagli trans., 1999) (discussing the void from which constituent power emerges). 
33 Id. at  321 (on how “constitutionalism is an apparatus that denies constituent power and 
democracy. It should not appear strange . . . that constitutionalism runs into paradoxes when it tries to 
define constituent power”). On Negri’s thinking of the constituent power, see Miguel Vatter, Legality 
and Resistance: Arendt and Negri on Constituent Power, in 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANTONIO NEGRI: 
REVOLUTION IN THEORY 52, 52 (Timothy S. Murphy & Abdul-Karim Mustapha eds., 2007). 
34 For an overview of these approaches, see generally KEMAL GÖZLER, POUVOIR CONSTITUANT 
(1999). 
35 Hans Kelsen, Why Should the Law Be Obeyed?, in WHAT IS JUSTICE?: JUSTICE, LAW, AND 
POLITICS IN THE MIRROR OF SCIENCE: COLLECTED ESSAYS BY HANS KELSEN 257, 261–63 (2001) 
(discussing the importance of norms in the acceptance of constitutional power); HANS KELSEN, PURE 
THEORY OF LAW 201–03 (Max Knight trans., The Law Book Exch., Ltd. 2005) (1967); Hans Kelsen, 
The Function of a Constitution, in ESSAYS ON KELSEN 110 (Richard Tur & William Twining eds., 
1986). See also Joseph Raz, Kelsen’s Theory of the Basic Norm, in NORMATIVITY AND NORMS: 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON KELSENIAN THEMES 47, 48 (Stanley L. Paulson & Bonnie Litschewski 
Paulson eds., Bonnie Litschewski et al. trans., 1998) (discussing Kelsen’s theory of normative 
systems).  
 
2021] BOUNDARIES OF CONSTITUENT AUTHORITY 1389 
hence, it is unlimited, independent, and unconditional.36 Thus, the 
traditional approach regards constituent power as an absolute power to 
establish a new legal order.37 
The theory of a formless and limitless power of “the people” to break 
any legal or constitutional constraints at any time was regarded by some 
thinkers as dangerous and open to abuse. Hannah Arendt wrote about “the 
extraordinary ease with which the national will could be manipulated and 
imposed upon whenever someone was willing to take the burden or the 
glory of dictatorship upon himself. Napoleon Bonaparte was only the first 
in a long series of national statesmen who, to the applause of a whole 
nation, could declare: ‘I am the pouvoir constituant’”.38 Indeed, throughout 
history dictators seized governmental power, through revolutionary acts or 
coups, claiming to be the bearers of the constituent power.39 And even 
more recently, charismatic leaders have relied upon appeals to constituent 
power in order to manipulate popular sentiment and revolutionize the 
state’s institutional framework.40 
The classical view of constituent power, as described thus far, regards 
it as a power that is not, conceptually and logically, constrained by existing 
constitutional rules or procedures. It cannot be brought “within the four 
corners of the constitution.”41 This poses a dilemma. One the one hand, in 
a democracy, a new constitution is seen as the product of the people’s 
constituent power, a force that does not find limits in the existing 
constitution and that has always been directly associated with the “right to 
revolution.”42 As Kay noted, the ability of constituent power to disregard 
pre-existing legality is not necessarily negative as it may be conceived as 
establishing the “political bottom” for a new democratic constitution.43 On 
the other hand, not only is constituent power open to abuse but it also 
provides a carte blanche for transforming democracy to non-democratic 
                                                                                                                     
36 CARL J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY (4th ed. 1968). 
37 See, e.g., Upendra Baxi, Some Reflections on the Nature of Constituent Power, in INDIAN 
CONSTITUTION: TRENDS AND ISSUES 122, 136 (Rajeev Dhavan & Alice Jacov eds., 1978). 
38 HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 163 (1965).  
39 Renato Cristi, The Metaphysics of Constituent Power: Schmitt and the Genesis of Chile’s 1980 
Constitution, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1749, 1763–75 (2000) (discussing the rise of General Francisco 
Franco Bahamonde). 
40 See William Partlett, The Dangers of Popular Constitution-Making, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 193, 
226 (2012) (discussing the use of popular constitution-making in former Soviet countries); David 
Landau, Constitution-Making Gone Wrong, 64 ALA. L. REV. 923, 938–41 (2013) (discussing the 
Chávez regime’s rise to power and influence on Venezuela’s constitution); David Landau, Abusive 
Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 191 (2013) (discussing the use of constitutional means 
to erode democratic systems).  
41  CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS: NATURE AND 
DEVELOPMENT 117 (1937).   
42 Joel Colón-Ríos & Allan Hutchinson, Democracy and Revolution: An Enduring Relationship?, 
89 DENV. U. L. REV. 593, 599 (2012). 
43 Richard S. Kay, The Illegality of the Constitution, 4 CONST. COMMENT. 57, 58 (1987).  
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regimes. Claude Klein explains that while the transition from 
non-democratic regimes to democracy is always welcome, by accepting 
that said transition we need to accept the power of a transition in the other 
direction.44 In other words, the ability of constituent power to overthrow 
regimes must work in both directions.45 Ben Nwabueze puts it as follows:  
It would be expected that a democratic constitution would 
establish a constitutional government, indeed a constitutional 
democracy, and ideally, that should be the case, but this 
cannot be insisted upon as a condition of a democratic 
constitution. A people should be at liberty to choose . . . any 
form of government . . . it considers suitable for itself. . . . 
[T]here is no inherent limitation on their power of choice.”46  
So, in light of the unrestricted and boundless nature of constituent 
power, constitution-making moments were considered as a kind of 
“wild-west”, in the words of David Landau, free from any substantive 
limitations.47 In the next section, I offer an alternative conception of 
constituent power as was understood even by early writers.    
II. REVISITING CONSTITUENT POWER 
Constituent power as expressing the people’s power to establish their 
constitutional order is considered as some kind of a natural right. As The 
American Declaration of Independence of 1776 states, “whenever any 
Form of Government becomes destructive of [its] ends, it is the Right of 
the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government . . . .”48 In 
the famous Marbury v. Madison case, it was declared that the people have 
an “original right” to establish their government and fundamental 
principles according to which they wish to be governed.49 It is the people’s 
“original and supreme will” that organises the government and may define 
its limits.50 Nevertheless, is the people’s constituent power not simply the 
total of ‘natural sovereignty’ inherent in each individual with respect to 
himself?51 This begs the question why to prioritize this natural right over 
                                                                                                                     
44 Klein, supra note 1, at 31. 
45 Id.  
46 B.O. NWABUEZE, IDEAS AND FACTS IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 10 (1993). 
47  David Landau, The Importance of Constitution-Making, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 611, 616 
(2011-2012).  
48  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). See also Akhil Reed Amar, The 
Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside of Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 458 
(1994) (delineating the right of the polity to create, alter, or abolish their government given majority 
opinion in favor). 
49 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803). 
50 Id. 
51 Walter Berns, Judicial Review and the Rights and Laws of Nature, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 56–
60 (discussing natural rights as understood by the Founders in comparison to modern natural rights).   
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other natural rights supposedly belonging to individuals? In this section, I 
claim that the traditional conception according to which constituent power 
is unlimited is simply a misunderstanding of its nature, and that even the 
early revolutionary approach to constituent power regarded it as a power 
with boundaries.   
Returning to Abbe Sieyès, and his often-cited phrase, which is used to 
describe the unlimited nature of the constituent power: “The nation exists 
prior to everything; it is the origin of everything. Its will is always legal. It 
is the law itself.” 52 The final words of this sentence, which are often 
omitted, are of crucial importance: “Prior to the nation and above the 
nation there is only natural law.”53 This might imply that even Sieyès, the 
greatest theorist of constituent power, viewed it as limited by certain 
principles derived from his natural law conceptions.54 If one takes Sieyès’ 
understanding of the nation as “the mass of associated men . . . all equal in 
rights,”55 it may well be that constituent power is bound to respect certain 
rights that belong to all peoples. In other words, constituent power is 
preceded by and subordinated to natural rights of man, which the political 
association serves to protect.56 
It is not difficult to understand this conception which finds its roots in 
the medieval understanding of natural law as a certain “divine will of god” 
with immutable characteristics.57 Natural law is based on the premise that 
there is a perpetual higher law which is superior even to the sovereign. 
This is compatible with how early political writers conceived natural law. 
Even in Jean Bodin’s theory of sovereignty, the power of the “sovereign 
prince” was not unlimited, but was restricted by natural law: 
[f]or if we say that to have absolute power is not to be 
subject to any law at all, no prince of this world will be 
sovereign, since every earthly prince is subject to the laws 
of God and of nature and to various human laws that are 
common to all peoples.58  
                                                                                                                     
52 SIEYÈS, supra note 16, at 136.  
53 Id.  
54  See William E. Scheuerman, Revolutions and Constitutions: Hannah Arendt’s Challenge to 
Carl Schmitt, 10 CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 141, 149 (1997) (exploring Sieyès’s conception of natural 
law). 
55  Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, A Preliminary to the Constitution [1789], in AN ACCOUNT OF THE 
LIFE OF SIEYÈS 77, 95 (Konrad Engelbert Oelsner ed., 2013). 
56  Raymond Kubber, L’Abbe de Sieyès–Champion of National Representation, Father of 
Constitutions, in CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CLASSICS: PATTERNS OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT FROM 
FORTESCUE TO BENTHAM 290, 299 (D.J. Galligan ed., 2014).  
57 THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW 63–64 (Richard J. Regan trans., 2000).  
58  JEAN  BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY: FOUR CHAPTERS FROM THE SIX BOOKS OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH 10 (Julian H. Franklin ed. & trans., 2004). See Stéphane Beaulac, The Social Power 
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If natural law is supreme, then it cannot be violated, not even by the 
constitution. Indeed, many great Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century 
European thinkers such as Pufendorf, Vattel, Burlamaqui, and Rutherforth 
believed that governmental power was limited by natural law and could not 
contradict it.59  
Within modern ideas of natural law and natural rights, which rest upon 
the relationship between law and morals, law is a means to achieve certain 
moral values, which can be discovered by reason.60 Invoking “natural law” 
or “natural rights,” some scholars hold the view that certain rights have a 
supra-constitutional status in that they cannot be altered even by 
constitutional means, such as constitution-making.61 If the constitution is a 
form of human law, it must be subject to the higher standard of natural 
law.62 As Roscoe Pound explained, “there are rights in every free 
government beyond the reach of the state, apparently beyond the reach 
even of a constitution . . . .”63  
In France, the question of the existence of any supra-constitutional 
limits on the constituent power has received rather wide attention.64 For 
example, authors such as Maurice Hauriou and Léon Duguit defend the 
                                                                                                                     
of Bodin’s ‘Sovereignty’ and International Law, 4 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 1, 13–15 (2003) (discussing 
Bodin’s theory of sovereignty).   
59 J. J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW 156 (7th ed. 1859); T. 
RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW 373 (2d ed. 1832); EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF 
NATIONS 20 (Joseph Chitty & Edward D. Ingraham eds., 1852); 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE 
NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO: THE TRANSLATION OF THE EDITION OF 1688, at 1133 (C. H. 
Oldfather & W. A. Oldfather trans., 1934). 
60 See, e.g.,  ALEXANDER PASSERIN D’ENTRÈVES, NATURAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY 54, 78–79 (Routledge 2017) (1951) (discussing the relationship between morals, law, and 
reason).  
61  Alec Stone Sweet, The Politics of Constitutional Review in France and Europe, 5 INT’L. J. 
CONST. L. 69, 84 n.40 (2007); Everett V. Abbott, Inalienable Rights and the Eighteenth Amendment, 20 
COLUM. L. REV. 183, 184 (1920); Jeff Rosen, Note, Was the Flag Burning Amendment 
Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073–74 (1991).  
62 CHARLES E. RICE, 50 QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAW: WHAT IT IS AND WHY WE NEED IT 
115 (Ignatius Press rev. ed. 1999) (1993).  
63 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 499 n.92 (2008).  
64  See, e.g., Stéphane Rials, Supraconstitutionnalite et Systematicite du Droit, in ARCHIVES DE 
PHILOSOPHIE DE DROIT 57 (1986) (defining the notion of supra-constitutionality and demonstrating 
how supra-constitutionality manifests itself in particular through the French Declarations of Rights, and 
analyzing the consequences of supra-constitutional principles on the legal system); Serge Arné, 
Existe-t-il des normes supra-constitutionnelles, 2 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 460 (1993) (defining 
supra-constitutionality as the superiority of certain rules or principles qualified as ‘norms,’ which may 
appear expressly or implicitly in the text, over the content of the Constitution); Louis Favoreu, 
Souveraineté et supraconstitutionnalité, 67 POUVOIRS 71 (1993) (covering sovereignty and 
supra-constitutionality); Georges Vedel, Souveraineté et supraconstitutionnalité, 67 POUVOIRS  79 
(1993) (discussing the points at which sovereignty and supra-constitutionality intersect); Michel 
Troper, On Super-Constitutional Principles, in JUSTICE, MORALITY AND SOCIETY: A TRIBUTE TO 
ALEKSANDER PECZENIK ON THE OCCASION OF HIS 60TH BIRTHDAY 411 (Aulis Aarnio et al. eds., 1997) 
(discussing the contradictory terms in the expression “super-constitutional”). 
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view that the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789 is 
not constitutive but rather recognizes and declares pre-existing rights and 
therefore has a supra-constitutional status. Accordingly, the Declaration of 
Rights imposes limits on the state’s ordinary legislative powers and even 
on constitutional legislation.65  
Drawing on the writings of Hauriou, even Schmitt had argued, during 
the Weimar period, that certain basic freedoms “have, as an outstanding 
French theorist of public law, Maurice Hauriou has explained, a 
‘superlégalité constitutionelle’, which is raised not only above the usual 
simple laws, but also over the written constitutional laws . . . .”66  
Paradoxically perhaps, this notion was revived after the Second World 
War as German jurisprudence in the post-Nazi regime era was 
characterised by the rejection of pure positivism and the endorsement of 
natural law ideas and supra-constitutional principles which are superior to 
positive law.67 This was best expressed by the Bavarian Constitutional 
Court’s famous statement from 1950: “There are fundamental 
constitutional principles, which are of so elementary a nature and so much 
the expression of a law that precedes the constitution, that the maker of the 
constitution himself is bound by them. Other constitutional norms . . . can 
be void because they conflict with them.”68 In the 1951 Southwest case, the 
German Federal Constitutional Court cited and re-affirmed this 
statement.69 According to this understanding, the constitution-making 
power can establish a system of rules and values only within the limits 
imposed by higher natural law which exists “above” positive law.70 
Since by definition, natural law is considered as external and superior 
to all positive law, a theory that recognises natural law as a form of a 
superior higher law must lead to the conclusion that the constituent power 
is limited. Accordingly, the reading of the traditional conception of 
constituent power as extra-legal, does not necessarily draw the conclusion 
that it is an unlimited power. In other words, according to this 
                                                                                                                     
65 MAURICE HAURIOU, PRÉCIS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 245 (1923); LÉON DUGUIT, TRAITÉ 
DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 560–61 (2d ed. 1923). For sources cited in both HAURIOU and DUGUIT, 
see Alain Laquièze, État de Droit and National Sovereignty in France, in THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, 
THEORY AND CRITICISM 267–68 (Pietro Costa & Danilo Zolo eds., 2007).  
66  GOPAL BALAKRISHNAN, THE ENEMY: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT OF CARL SCHMITT 162 
(2000). For Schmitt’s original language, see CARL SCHMITT, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY 58–60 
(Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., 2000) (1932). 
67  Gottfried Dietze, Unconstitutional Constitutional Norms? Constitutional Development in 
Postwar Germany, 42 VA. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1956); Heinrich Rommen, Natural Law in Decisions of the 
Federal Supreme Court and of the Constitutional Courts in Germany, 4 NAT. L.F. 1, 5 (1959). 
68 Decision from April 4, 1950, 2 Verwaltungs-Rechtsrechung No. 65, quoted in Dietze, supra 
note 67, at 16. 
69  Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 23, 1951, 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1, 14 (Ger.). 
70 OTTO BACHOF, VERFASSUNGSWIDRIGE VERFASSUNGSNORMEN? 15–32 (1951).  
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understanding, constituent power may be extra-constitutional and unbound 
by existing constitutional forms or limitations, allowing the people to 
replace the constitution with a new one or adopt a constitution in a 
constitutional vacuum, but it might still be subordinated to natural law and 
rights boundaries.71                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Theories of natural law are of course controversial and raise many 
difficulties. In the sections that follow, I argue that even if one does not 
accept the above understanding of constituent power as bound by natural 
law, there are nowadays three possible routes of restrictions on constituent 
power. These derive from international law, basic principles of 
constitutionalism, and limits inherent in the notion of constituent power as 
the power of a people giving itself a constitution. 
III. EXPLORING THREE ROUTES OF RESTRICTIONS ON CONSTITUENT 
POWER 
In this section I would like to argue that constituent power must be 
regarded as limited by evolving norms of international law, 
constitutionalism, and the nature of constituent power itself.   
A. International and other Supra-national Law 
Contemporary international and supra-national law influence our 
understanding of the constitution-making process,72 and may also shape 
our understanding of constituent power as a limited power. 73  
It has been increasingly argued of late that the constitutional powers, 
including constitution-making and amending powers, are substantially 
limited by international law, such as international human rights law or jus 
cogens norms.74 Also, emerging international and supra-national legal rules 
                                                                                                                     
71 MARKKU SUKSI, BRINGING IN THE PEOPLE: A COMPARISON OF CONSTITUTIONAL FORMS AND 
PRACTICES OF THE REFERENDUM 25–26 (1993).  
72 See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck & Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Norms of International Law Relating 
to the Constitution-Making Process, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES 
IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 3, 3–5 (Laurel E. Miller ed., 2010); Vivien Hart, Constitution Making and 
the Right to Take Part in a Public Affair, in FRAMING THE STATE, supra at 20, 20–22; Thomas M. 
Franck & Arun K. Thiruvengadam, International Law and Constitution-Making, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 
467, 468–70 (2003). 
73  See Didier Maus, The Influence of Contemporary International Law on the Exercise of 
Constituent Power, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS IN THE ERA OF INTEGRATION, supra note 1, at 45, 
54–57 (discussing constituent power within international public law, specifically in the form of 
treaties). 
74  For further discussion on the limitations that international law imposes on constitutional law, 
see, for example, Matthias Hartwig, What Legitimises a National Constitution? On the Importance of 
International Embedding, in CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL AREA: 
THEORY, LAW AND POLITICS IN HUNGARY AND ROMANIA 311, 324–27 (Armin von Bogdandy & Pál 
Sonnevend eds., 2015); Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193, 1195–97 
(2005); Vincent J. Samar, Can a Constitutional Amendment Be Unconstitutional?, 33 OKLA. CITY U. L. 
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now address issues such as constitutional transformations.75 Larry Backer 
summarises this idea: “[S]upra-national constitutionalism posited limits on 
national constitution-making grounded in an evolving set of foundational 
universal norms derived from the understandings of basic right and wrong 
developed by consensus among the community of nations.”76 
In an earlier work, I examined possible supra-constitutional limitations 
on the constitutional amendment power.77 I have argued that from the 
perspective of international law, a state has to comply with its international 
obligations regardless of any conflicting domestic laws, even if it is 
constitutional law.78 According to Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties of 1969: “A party may not invoke the provisions of its 
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”79 The phrase 
‘internal law’ includes internal constitutional law. This is supported by 
international judicial practice. In the international arbitration case of 
Montijo from 1875, it was stated that “a treaty is superior to the 
constitution, which latter must give way.”80 In the Permanent Court of 
International Justice Advisory Opinion from 1932 regarding Treatment of 
Polish Nationals in the Danzig Territory, the Court stated that according to 
generally accepted principles: “[A] State cannot adduce as against another 
State its own Constitution with a view to evading obligations incumbent 
upon it under international law or treaties in force.”81 Such superiority of 
supra-national law over domestic constitutions was also established in 
regional jurisprudence. For example, in several cases, the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) established its authority to review constitutional 
                                                                                                                     
REV. 667, 693 (2008); Jorge Tapia Valdés, Poder Constituyente Irregular: Los Límites Metajurídicos 
del Poder Constituyente Originario, 6 ESTUDIOS CONSTITUCIONALES 121, 122–24 (2008). 
75 David Landau, Democratic Erosion and Constitution-Making Moments: The Role of 
International Law, 2 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L TRANSNAT’L & COMP. L. 87, 100–05 (2017); Stephen J. 
Schnably, Emerging International Law Constraints on Constitutional Structure and Revision: A 
Preliminary Appraisal, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 417, 422 (2008). 
76  Larry Catá Backer, God(s) Over Constitutions: International and Religious Transnational 
Constitutionalism in the 21st Century, 27 MISS. C. L. REV. 11, 16–17 (2007).  
77  Yaniv Roznai, The Theory and Practice of ‘Supra-Constitutional’ Limits on Constitutional 
Amendments, 62 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 557, 558, 593 (2013). 
78 See id. at 577 (“For international law, a state has to comply with its international obligations 
regardless of any conflicting domestic laws—be it primary legislation, secondary legislation or even a 
constitutional norm.”). 
79 United Nations Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 
331.  
80 Anne Peters, Supremacy Lost: International Law Meets Domestic Constitutional Law, 3 ICL J. 
170, 183–84, 184 n.74 (2009) (citing JOHN BASSETT MOORE, Case of the “Montijo”: Agreement 
Between the United States and Colombia of August 17, 1874, in HISTORY AND DIGEST OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 1421, 1440 
(1898)). 
81Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig  
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 42, at 24 (Feb. 4). 
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provisions vis-à-vis the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).82 
In one case, the ECtHR criticized Article 70(5) of the Hungarian 
Constitution for indiscriminately depriving the right to vote from persons 
placed under total or partial guardianship.83 In Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the ECtHR held that a constitutional provision limiting 
the right to be elected in parliamentary and presidential elections to people 
belonging to Bosniak, Croatian, and Serb groups is discriminatory, and the 
disqualification of Jewish and Roma origin candidates constitutes a breach 
of the ECHR.84 In the case of Anchugov and Gladkov, the ECtHR declared 
that the Russian Constitution’s absolute ban on the right to vote for 
prisoners was incompatible with the Convention.85 Accordingly, Marco 
Antonio Simonelli rightly claimed that “the Strasbourg Court is in the right 
position to play a key role in verifying the compliance with the Convention 
. . . of constitutional amendments and provisions and thus in the 
dissemination of the idea of a supranational constitutionalism.”86 Thus, 
today, the core protections of the ECHR functions as some kind of 
“minimum constitutional guarantees.”87 
The superiority of regional law over domestic constitutional law is not 
restricted to Europe. In its advisory opinion number four, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that its authority includes all 
national legislation, including constitutional legislation.88 For fifteen years, 
this determination had not been applied until the Castillo Petruzzi and 
Others v. Peru case, in which the court ordered, for the first time, to amend 
a constitutional provision that limited access to the court.89 And, in 
Olmedo-Bustos et al. v. Chile, the court held that the Chilean Constitution 
concerning film censorship is incompatible with the Inter-American 
                                                                                                                     
82 See Lech Garlicki & Zofia A. Garlicki, External Review of Constitutional Amendments? 
International Law as a Norm of Reference, 44 ISR. L. REV. 343, 362–63, 363 n.42 (2011) (discussing 
two cases in which the European Court of Human Rights reviewed the conventionality of constitutional 
provisions). 
83 Alajos Kiss v. Hungary, App. No. 38832/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2, 12–13 (2010). 
84  Sejdić v. Bosnia & Herzegovina, App. No. 27996/06 & 34836/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. 32–36 (2009).    
85 Anchugov & Gladkov v. Russia, App. No. 11157/04 & 15162/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 30 (2013). 
86   Marco Antonio Simonelli, Towards a Theory of “Unconventional Constitutional 
Amendments”: Some Lessons from the Baka Case, 39 DPCE ONLINE 1561, 1578 (2019). 
87  Tilmann Altwicker, Convention Rights as Minimum Constitutional Guarantees? The Conflict 
Between Domestic Constitutional Law and the European Convention of Human Rights, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL AREA: THEORY, LAW AND POLITICS IN 
HUNGARY AND ROMANIA, supra note 74, at 331, 333. 
88  Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica, 
Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 4, ¶ 14 (Jan. 19, 1984), 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_04_ing.pdf.  
89 Castillo Petruzzi et al. Case, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 52, at 67, ¶ 14 (May 30, 
1999), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/44e494cb4.pdf. 
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Convention on Human Rights, and following which Chile amended its 
constitution accordingly.90  
In Africa, the African Court on Human and People’s Rights established 
its authority to review the compatibility of constitutional norms with the 
African Convention on Human and People’s Rights.91 In 2013, in Mtikila 
and Others v. Republic of Tanzania case, the African Court held that 
certain prohibitions on the right of independent candidates to be elected 
infringes the Convention and ordered Tanzania to reexamine its 
constitutional provisions.92  
A final example is the Security Council (SC) Resolution 554 of 1984 
regarding the Constitution of South Africa of 1983 that entrenched 
apartheid.93 In that resolution, the SC declared that it “strongly rejects and 
declares as null and void the so-called ‘new constitution,’” due to its 
contradiction of the principles of the U.N. Charter, mainly racial equality.94 
This resolution demonstrates that constitutions can no longer ignore 
international settings.95  
This section aimed to show that it is now plausible to derive certain 
limitations on constituent authority from international and supra-national 
norms, which place boundaries on constitutional powers.  
Nevertheless, as I elaborated elsewhere, the main problem with such 
limitations is their enforceability. Recall, although the South African 
Constitution of 1983 was declared “null and void,” it remained in force for 
ten years, until it was replaced by the Interim Constitution in 1994.96 And 
decisions of the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights, or any other regional 
court for that matter, do not directly affect the legal validity of domestic 
constitutional provisions.97 In the cases of Sejdie and Finci v. Bosnia and 
                                                                                                                     
90 Case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, 
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95  See Ulrich K. Preuss, Perspectives on Post-Conflict Constitutionalism: Reflections on Regime 
Change Through External Constitutionalization, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 466, 492 (2006–2007) 
(discussing the need to consider global surroundings in evaluating the role of constitutions). 
96 Jeremy Sarkin, The Drafting of South Africa’s Final Constitution from a Human-Rights 
Perspective, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 67, 67 (1999). 
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Herzegovina, Mtikila and Others v. Republic of Tanzania, and Anchugov 
and Gladkov, notwithstanding the regional courts’ decisions, the 
“unconventional” constitutional provisions remain valid. The influence of 
supra-national tribunals is only in the external—not internal—juridical 
sphere.98 
This does not mean that international law has no role to play within the 
domestic sphere. A recent development in Latin America, in that respect, is 
telling. In several cases, domestic courts in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, 
Honduras, and Bolivia, used international law, and especially human rights 
law, to declare invalid or ineffective constitutional provisions concerning 
presidential term limits.99 Limiting the term of office, according to these 
cases, contradicts international human rights law and the right to elect or 
be elected.100 Arguably, such decisions, although making international law 
effective within the domestic sphere, are not necessarily a blessing for 
international law as they also demonstrate how courts (and often captured 
courts) can misuse international human rights to promote anti-democratic 
agendas.101   
                                                                                                                     
COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS. (Aug. 23, 2016), https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/23/2/401/ 
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p.m., 19 Oct. 2009, Sala de lo Constitucional, Boletín Judicial [B.J.] [Supreme Court of Justice] p. 23, 
Cons. III (Nicar.); Sentencia F-165, Corte Suprema de Justicia: Sala de lo Constitucional [Supreme 
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POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS 53 (Alexander Baturo & Robert Elgie eds., 2019) (describing 
the decisions in a number of countries, including these four, holding term limits unconstitutional); 
Yaniv Roznai, Constitutional Unamendability in Latin America Gone Wrong?, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE AND TRANSFORMATION IN LATIN AMERICA 93, 94 (Richard Albert et al. eds., 2019) 
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F-165, F-180 (Hond.); Sentencia [S.] No. 504, de las 5:00 p.m., 19 Oct. 2009, Sala de lo 
Constitucional, Boletín Judicial [B.J.] [Supreme Court of Justice] p. 23, Cons. III (Nicar.); Sentencia 
02771, Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia [Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme 
Court of Justice] Apr. 4, 2003, XII (Costa Rica). 
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In any case, both these domestic and supra-national courts’ decisions 
demonstrate that there are supra-national boundaries on constituent 
authority—boundaries that may even be enforced in courts.   
B. Basic Constitutional Principles 
A second route of restricting constituent power is through basic 
constitutional principles. In this section, I have divided such principles into 
three sub-groups: eternity clauses, pre-agreed-upon principles, and basic 
principles of constitutionalism.  
1. Eternity Clauses 
Over one third of world constitutions include “eternity clauses.”102 
Eternity clauses are constitutional provisions that stipulate that certain 
values, rules, or institutions are beyond the constitutional amendment 
power.103 They are unamendable.104 Perhaps the best example is Art. 79(3) 
of the German Basic Law from 1949, which prohibits constitutional 
amendments affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, human 
dignity, the constitutional order, or basic institutional principles describing 
Germany as a democratic and social federal state.105 This provision was 
written against the backdrop of the Weimar Constitution’s experience in an 
attempt to declare these fundamental values as perpetual.106  
The crucial questions for our matter are: do these provisions limit in 
any way the constituent authority? Can they? In other words, if the German 
people exercise their constituent power to create a totally new constitution, 
are they bound by the limits of Art. 79(3)? This is a question that intrigued 
Richard Kay.107 Some German authors have opined that Art. 79(3) must 
                                                                                                                     
102 Dainius alimas, President, Constitutional Court of Lithuania, Eternity Clauses: A Safeguard 
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106 Goerlich, supra note 105, at 398. 
107 Kay, supra note 13, at 727.  
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apply to future constitution-making processes.108 Others have claimed that 
the eternity clause does not limit the people’s constituent power, while 
some have remarked that this issue should be solved by the Federal 
Constitutional Court.109 However, in the Lisbon Case, the Constitutional 
Court left this question unanswered.110   
I think that the answer to this complex question should be negative. 
Such provisions limit only the more limited amendment power, but they 
cannot limit the constituent power, which—as aforementioned—is 
unbound by the rules of the prior constitution. Eternity clauses restrict the 
amending power (what I term the secondary constituent power), but they 
do not restrict the original (or primary) constituent power of the people, 
who are ultimately free to shape and reshape their society, independent 
from constitutional boundaries.111 This, however, does not mean that 
constitutional principles cannot limit constituent authority in certain 
instances.  
2. Pre-determined Principles 
At times, the constitution-making process is guided by pre-determined, 
pre-agreed-upon, or pre-imposed principles. An example of the latter might 
be “the terse instructions of the military governors in Germany to the 
Parlamentarischer Rat in 1948, provid[ing] parameters that facilitated the 
expeditious production of a clear basic law.”112  
In the 1970s, the prescription of binding principles to 
constitution-makers occurred in the international involvement in 
Namibia.113 In 1977, the U.S., Canada, France, the U.K., and Germany 
initiated diplomatic efforts to solve the problem of South Africa.114 In 
1982, in consultation with all interested parties, they (the “Western Contact 
Group”) produced a set of “principles for a constitution for an independent 
                                                                                                                     
108 For a discussion of the debate among German authors, see Christoph Möllers, ‘We are (afraid 
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109  Id.; see also JO ERIC KHUSHAL MURKENS, FROM EMPIRE TO UNION: CONCEPTIONS OF 
GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SINCE 1871, at 173–75 (2013). 
110  BverfG, 2 BvR 182/09, June 30, 2009, 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html (discussing 
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Namibia” to guide the constitution-making process.115 The principles 
included: supremacy of a rigid and justiciable constitution, separation of 
powers, regular multi-party democratic elections, bill of rights, prohibition 
on retroactive legislation, balanced public and security services, fair 
personnel policies, and elected councils for regional or local 
administrations.116 The principles obtained international legitimacy through 
their acceptance by the U.N. Security Council.117 When the constituent 
assembly was established, it abided by the latter principles.118 
The idea of fundamental principles as limiting constitution-making 
received an interesting treatment during the establishment of the new 
post-apartheid South-African constitution. The interim Constitution of 
1994 stipulated that the constitution-making process would take place 
within a framework of thirty-four agreed-upon principles.119 These 
principles ensured that political parties publicly pledge themselves to a 
definite vision, clarifying the direction of the constitution-making 
process.120 The Constitutional Court of South Africa was empowered to 
review the draft Constitution’s compliance with those principles. In its 
review (the famous Certification case), the Court declared that the 
Constitution, although establishing democratic institutions and protecting 
human rights, failed to comply with certain agreed-upon principles, and 
was therefore unconstitutional.121 Only after the amendment of the draft 
Constitution did the Constitutional Court declare that it complied with the 
principles.122 
Therefore, it appears that there is a possibility of imposing limitations 
on constitution-making powers through pre-determined principles. Yet, it 
                                                                                                                     
115 Principles for a Constitution for an Independent Namibia, reprinted in SOUTHERN AFRICA IN 
THE COLD WAR, POST-1974, at 434 (Sue Onslow & Anna-Mart Van Wyk eds., 2013). 
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117 Wiechers, supra note 113, at 8. 
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Sorabjee ed., 2003). 
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is fair to say that constituent power voluntarily accepted upon itself these 
limitations rather than being obliged by them. Alternatively, one may claim 
that the initial decision concerning the guiding principles was the “real” 
constitution-making moment.123 Regardless of any theoretical approach 
taken to explain such constitution-making process, what is clear is that 
constitution-making power may be successfully restricted by pre-agreed 
principles.  
In the next sub-section, I argue the modern understanding of 
constitutionalism may limit the scope of exercise of constitution-making 
powers.  
3. Basic Principles of Constitutionalism 
In the Eighteenth century, a significant political objective behind 
constitution-making was freedom. Constitutionalism as a movement was 
directed against monarchical absolutism, and its consequent oppressive 
restrictions upon individual freedoms. Likewise, as lessons of totalitarian 
dictatorships, post-WWII constitution-making put, once again, freedom as 
its prime objective.124 Clearly, nowadays it is a common understanding that 
“[p]rinciples of freedom should guide the liberated nations and republics in 
framing their constitutions.”125   
In the past, the idea of constitutionalism seemed to introduce a 
supra-positivist element of evaluation to constitutional theory by insisting 
that a law may be “legal” according to positive law but “unconstitutional” 
if it conflicts with historically received, imperative constitutional norms—a 
“spirit of the laws” to use Montesquieu,126 or Volksgeist, as juridically 
formulated by von Savigny as the accumulated weight of the national legal 
tradition.127  
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Nowadays, constitutionalism is anchored on certain principles such as 
the recognition of the people as the source of all governmental authority; 
the supremacy of the constitution; the constitutional regulation and 
limitations of the power of government; and adherence for the rule of law 
and respect for fundamental rights.128 And it appears, as François Venter 
claimed, that the growing universality of standards of constitutionalism 
represents a significant form of integration whereby a common language of 
constitutionalism is being developed. These principles of the modern 
constitutional states which are becoming globally standardized may have a 
powerful influence on the legitimacy of the constitution.129  
Vicki C. Jackson asserts that the goal of constitution-making is not to 
produce a written constitution, but to promote constitutionalism.130 
Constitutions are a means, not goals themselves. Therefore, an emerging 
approach may well be that constitutionalism and constitutions are 
inseparably linked so that an exercise of constituent power which would 
undermine principles of constitutionalism would not automatically bind 
society.131 Recall Art. 16 of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man of 
1789 that puts it bluntly: “A society in which the guarantee of rights is not 
assured, nor the separation of powers provided for, has no constitution.”132 
This is a conceptual argument. Just as a chair requires certain features to be 
considered a chair, so thus a constitution must include certain features in 
order to be described as a constitution. In other words, in order to be 
legitimately exercised, constituent power must ensure certain basic 
principles of constitutionalism.133 This might seem to be a limitation which 
is imposed upon constituent power from its very purpose. As Carlos Bernal 
recently argued:  
[T]here cannot be a constitution without constitutionalism. In 
this regard, the concept of a constitution, which we use in 
both ordinary and technical language, implies, at least, four 
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essential elements: the rule of law, the principle of the 
separation of powers, some sort of protection to individual 
rights or—at least—interests that are guaranteed by the 
Constitution or the legislation, and an entrenchment of the 
democratic idea that the legitimacy of government rests on 
the consent of its subjects.134 
Nevertheless, since under the banner of constitutionalism there are 
numerous nuances of ideas—and each carries a myriad of different formal 
and substantive aspects, varied and contested meanings—it is very difficult 
to develop a comprehensive treatise on the precise meaning of 
constitutionalism: “the greatest crisis of constitutionalism is the absence of 
universal consensus on its nature and purpose.”135 This is the main 
challenge for any theory of limitations on constitution-making powers 
deriving from basic principles of constitutionalism. However, I think that 
this challenge might be relaxed. While we perhaps cannot agree on a 
precise list of what the basic principles of constitutionalism are and what 
these principles exactly include,136 we can agree, at the very minimum, on 
what are the essential principles of constitutionalism and what is the 
minimal core of these principles. This may be a useful starting point for 
understanding the essential characteristics of constitutionalism, and 
without which the exercise of constituent power would be illegitimate.  
C. Limitations inherent to the concept of Constituent Power 
Finally, I wish to suggest that the very concept of constituent power 
may carry certain inherent limitations, by the fact that at the basis of the 
theory of constituent power is the power of the people to create and 
recreate their constitutional world. It must involve actual, deliberate, free 
choice by society’s members.137 While it is preferable that the exercise of 
constituent power should be inclusive, participatory, and deliberative—
after all, the word constituere, Andreas Kalyvas reminds us, marks the act 
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of founding together, jointly138—I do not claim that this is an inherent 
limitation on constituent power. Rather, I make two more modest claims.  
First, an important aspect of the exercise of constituent power is the 
maintenance of the core of freedoms such as freedom of speech, free and 
fair elections, freedom from arbitrary arrest, and freedom of assembly and 
association, the absence of which “spell the death for the legal concept that 
is constituent power.”139  
Walter Murphy contended that there are certain limitations even “on 
the constitutive power of the people as whole.”140 Basing his argument on 
John Stuart Mill’s rejection of a person’s right to sell him to slavery, 
Murphy claims that even if the whole population agreed to destroy the 
democratic order and replace it with a new order that would deny them 
democracy’s basic values, this might be prohibited in order to protect 
themselves and future generations.141 I wish to take this argument forward 
but in a narrower manner and from a different angle. 
In order to protect the very idea of constituent power; in order for 
constituent power to be exercised in the future and to allow and facilitate 
the people’s exercise of constituent power, those rights which form the 
basis of constituent power must be protected.142 In other words, the 
exercise of constituent power cannot result in the abolition of rights such as 
freedom of expression and assembly, and political rights, which are 
necessary in order for constituent power to reappear in the future.143 The 
exercise of constituent power must maintain its “capacity to rethink the 
constitutional order as a whole”144 Minimum core of rights that are 
necessary for constituent power to be exercised and re-exercised must be 
kept.  
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Second, the exercise of constituent power must be consistent with the 
idea of “the people.”145 An exercise of constituent power that results in the 
alienation of groups in the society undermines the very raison d'être of 
constituent power. Constituent power must be committed to popular 
sovereignty.146 If “the people” or some parts thereof are excluded from the 
polity and are no longer able to exercise constituent power, this should 
influence the legitimacy of the constitution-making process.147 One cannot 
use “constituent power” in order to undermine the very notion of 
“constituent power.” This limitation is of course one of legitimacy, not of 
legality.  
CONCLUSION 
David Dyzenhaus has recently argued that the question of constituent 
power exists outside of normative constitutional theory.148 Dyzenhaus 
encouraged constitutional scholars to focus on the constitution’s authority 
as founded on the intrinsic morality of law rather than to concentrate their 
effort on the idea of constituent power, which is external to the legal 
order.149 However, constituent power remains a central theme in 
constitutional theory. I agree with János Kis that there is no other 
satisfactory answer but “the power of the people” as the ultimate source of 
state power, and instead of abandoning constituent power, “[i]t should be 
given such an interpretation that. . . may not be mobilized for the purposes 
of totalitarian politics.”150 This Article is a beginning of an attempt to 
reconceive constituent power, or perhaps to better understand its scope.  
The conception underlying sovereign power is that it is unlimited and 
subject to no law.151 Indeed, McIlwain writes, “[s]peaking generally, the 
power of the people can have no limits. It is idle to speak of it as either de 
facto or de jure if this implies a difference. . . .”152 Certainly, according to 
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the traditional conception of constituent power, it is original, inherent and 
unlimited power.153 However, McIlwain also argued: 
I want to plead here against any weakening of our 
constitutional  limitations of power, even the power of the 
people themselves; in the interest of individuals or minorities 
among the people. For the people have now succeeded to the 
power of  the benevolent despots of the eighteenth century, 
and in the  exercise of it they are often swayed by special 
interests or crafty demagogues as their predecessors were by 
favourites. I frankly want to rely on the earlier, the sounder, 
yes the  medieval principle, that there are some individual 
rights that even a people’s government can never touch.154 
Long ago, Benjamin Constant, who feared the danger posed to liberty 
by revolutionaries like Robespierre and his fellow Jacobins, cautioned 
against the danger of unlimited popular sovereignty.155 While embracing 
the principle of popular sovereignty, Constant claimed that neither the 
people as a whole nor their representatives possess total authority over the 
lives of individuals: “Sovereignty of the people is not unlimited.”156 
Indeed, constituent power is not unlimited. True, it is unconstrained by 
existing (or prior) constitutional norms but it is not omnipotent. 
Constituent power, I claimed, was never considered to be totally without 
bounds, as scholars regarded it as restricted by notions of natural law or 
natural rights.  
Returning to Richard Kay’s article on constituent authority, the 
concluding words are fascinating. Constituent authority, Kay writes, is a 
fact.157 “Since it is a fact that principally concerns how people regard 
constituent events, however, it can and does change over time.”158 I argue 
that regardless of how constituent power was traditionally understood in 
the past (although I tried to show why such readings were not always 
accurate), nowadays, constituent authority has changed. It should no longer 
be considered as a boundless power. At present time, one may sketch three 
routes of boundaries on constitution-making powers: boundaries deriving 
from international and supra-national law; boundaries deriving from basic 
principles (either determined prior to constitution-making process or 
deriving from basic understanding of constitutionalism); and boundaries 
inherent in the very concept of constituent power. Of course, a related but 
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different question to any internal or external constraints on 
constitution-making power is their enforcement. Even if such limitations 
exist, as I claim, it is questionable how likely they are to work in 
practice.159 I leave this question for another time.  
In a recent conference, Ignacio Gutierrez argued that the constituent 
power cannot do everything it wishes; it needs to “create a constitution.”160 
Can we, he asked, by exercising constituent power, select the song to the 
Eurovision?161 “The constituent authority may be many things[,]” Kay 
writes, “but it is not anything we want it to be.”162 In this Article, I claim 
that constituent authority may be many things, but it not unlimited. 
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